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Giuseppe Longobardi is Anniversary Professor of Linguistics in the Department 
of Language and Linguistic Science of the University of York. He has worked in 
theoretical and comparative syntax, with a special interest in the study of the 
structural correspondence of meaning. The structure of nominal expressions and 
the syntax of negation and negative quantifiers are two of the most prominent 
topics in his research. He has created a format for theories of grammatical 
diversity (Parametric Minimalism), and is currently developing an original 
comparative method for linguistic reconstruction based on syntactic parameters 
(Parametric Comparison Method). 
 
 
From your perspective, what are the relevant levels of abstractness to 
approach the Faculty of Language? The standard ones (namely “language,” 
“dialect,” and “idiolect”)? Others? 
Idiolect is probably the crucial one and the best identifiable, sometimes called I-
language since Chomsky (1986). Larger notions, from dialect to language, but 
even to language family, to language stock, are distributed on a continuum, which 
is created by linguists as a practical device on the basis of various degrees of the 
same concept, that of historically significant similarity (non-accidental and non-
universal language resemblance, formally grounded, as e.g. in Crisma and 
Longobardi 2009, Ringe and Eska 2013, in a recursive definition of relatedness 
based on I-language and primary data generated by it). I believe that this same 
latter concept grounds all those that go beyond idiolect, e.g. both the idea of two 
or more people speaking ‘the same language’ and of ‘languages from the same 
family’. As I said, the difference is just a matter of degree. An interesting 
challenge for linguistics is precisely quantifying such degrees, but there seem 
anyway not to be sharp non-arbitrary boundaries. 
In these terms, it is perhaps not even necessary for linguistics to resort to 
previous more complex idealizations, such as ‘the ideal speaker/hearer in a 
homogeneous linguistic community’ (Chomsky 1965). I-language alone, the 
single idiolect, in principle without appeal to the existence of other speakers, 
could suffice to ground pure ‘synchronic’ linguistic theory, even when the latter is 
understood as the answer to the ‘logical problem of language acquisition’: for, in 
pure theory and somewhat absurdly, one could imagine a situation of a single 
learner exposed to (i.e. a single language acquisition device activated by) 
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machine-produced language stimuli. Such a language acquisition device would be 
the object of linguistic theory. 
Historical linguistics is a more general notion, and would require two (but 
probably only two) founding concepts: I-language, again, and, indeed, historically 
significant similarity between at least two I-languages. Notice that, in this sense, 
somehow paradoxically, general (often called ‘synchronic’) linguistic theory is 
but a particular case of historical linguistics, rather than the opposite, namely the 
subcase in which in principle a linguistic competence is studied in relation to a 
primary corpus, not necessarily compared to ‘other minds’. 
 
What are the main advantages / reasons to study linguistic variation? 
First of all, very basically, if language is a mirror of mind (Chomsky 1975), then 
language variation is a mirror of human history. In addition, culturally transmitted 
variation is very peculiar (even though not unique) of the genus Homo and, as 
such, it gives us further insight in the structure of the human mind/brain and its 
plasticity. Syntactic variation, then, is very saliently structured and discrete, so as 
to formally provide an ideal domain to try to apply certain hypothetical-deductive 
models, popular and successful in the physical sciences, to an innovative, though 
now conceivable, ‘Galilean’ approach to cultural history. 
Why should syntactic history be so promising for this enterprise? I think 
we should examine some of the defining features of the success of the natural 
sciences. 
One thing is that the natural science revolution in the 17th and 18th 
centuries strongly assumed, and then proved, that nature is regular, universal, 
simple. In other words, natural laws were shown to exist, to hold anytime and 
anywhere (e.g. the mechanics of the sublunar world was unified with that of the 
celestial one), and also to be ultimately remarkably general, with elaborate 
deductive inference from simple axioms (cf. Nobel laureate J.B. Perrin’s 1912 
famous aphorism: ‘...la tâche de la science est de remplacer du visible compliqué 
par de l’invisible simple’). 
Now, language has been precisely argued to be regular (already since at 
least the Neogrammarian views on sound change and early structuralist 
phonology) and universal (since Jakobson’s and Greenberg’s proposals); now 
formal syntax has been argued to be even ‘simple’ in roughly the above sense 
(e.g. in Chomsky 1981, ch. 1, and within the so-called minimalist framework, 
Chomsky 1995, Boeckx and Piattelli Palmarini 2005). 
So, if formal synchronic linguistics and cognitive science can be pursued 
along the model of the natural sciences, now we may want to show that history, 
specifically linguistic and cognitive history, can be so pursued a well. 
 
How do you conceive the relation / tension between linguistic variation and 
linguistic uniformity throughout the years? 
In purely scientific terms, I have never seen much of a conflict there, beyond the 
long noticed tension between the two main goals of linguists stated in Chomsky 
(1964), descriptive adequacy and explanatory adequacy: wherever that tension is 
not resolved, that is simply a sign that insufficient progress has been made by 
linguists in that specific area, mostly an empirical rather than conceptual problem. 
In the actual practice, it is instead the case that language scholars often pursue and 
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privilege one or the other accordingly to their own tastes or scientific ‘biases’ 
(which may turn out to be very positive heuristically, by the way, no less than so-
called metaphysical research programs (Popper 1959)). In my personal view, it is 
very important that formal grammatical theories, while still struggling to identify 
‘the right level of abstraction’ for language representation, are more and more 
concerned with variation. Levinson and Evans (2010) have recently noted that 
many terms which one could say describe a sound approach to language variation 
begin in d-: so D-linguistics would be oriented toward ‘data’, ‘diachrony’, 
‘diversity’, perhaps even ‘Darwinism’, standing here for evolutionary models. I 
regard focus on these aspects as very important, indeed necessary for linguistic 
theories, but it seems to me that one of the crucial d-words is missing from the 
list, and that is ‘deduction’. All aspects of variation should be considered also and 
fundamentally in terms of deeply deductive models, precisely in order to test the 
response of the study of man to the approaches which produced the big revolution 
in the philosophia naturalis in the XVII century. 
 
In your opinion, what are the contributions of dialectology (both traditional 
and present-day studies) to the study of language? 
As I hinted before, there is probably no obvious qualitative difference between the 
concept of ‘different languages’ and ‘different dialects’. If by different dialects we 
mean comparison of very close and similar I-languages, then its usefulness is that 
found in any comparative enterprise: it is always safer to start comparing similar 
entities, because it is easier to single out the minimal differences, combining 
which it is then possible, perhaps, to understand superficially greater contrasts. 
 
What are the relevant sources to obtain evidence to study language and its 
variation (speakers’ own competence, corpora, experiments, non-linguistic 
disciplines, etc.)? Is any of them potentially more relevant than the others? 
I remember Massimo Piattelli Palmarini giving a series of highly instructive 
lectures, years ago, about the methodology of science (and what is not always 
understood about it in linguistics and the human sciences). One of the main points 
was that in the advanced sciences it is taken for granted that any source of 
evidence should in principle be accepted if enlightening for the understanding of a 
certain problem, without delimiting the evidence a priori. In this sense, I think 
that linguists should take data from every suggestive domain, manipulating and 
ranking them, of course, with a grain of wisdom: e.g. it would probably be less 
reasonable to take the evidence of an isolated fact from one potential source (say, 
diachronic corpus evidence or some individual processing experiment, or a single 
construction in an otherwise poorly studied language) and combine it with very 
intelligibly structured data from another rich type of source (e.g. a complex 
analysis based on detailed speakers’ judgments from several well analyzed 
languages) and assign them the same probative value. 
 
Your recent research has developed a new comparative method that adopts 
ideas from Genetics, Mathematics, and Computer Science (as well as 
theoretical formal linguistics). Can you briefly explain how using those non-
linguistic disciplines can contribute to our understanding of language 
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variation? What do you think is the position of standard theoretical 
approaches to language in such a broader research scenario? 
Traditional approaches to the study of language have been, with few exceptions 
which do not change the general picture, non-quantitative: such approaches have 
been very successful, allowing for discoveries of quite important generalizations 
from Grimm’s Law to parametric differences, to cite two. But the more we try to 
describe new aspects of language the more we are likely to bump into so complex 
arrays of facts that being able to treat them mathematically and computationally is 
necessary. Of course, I don’t believe at all that quantitative methods are all we can 
use for studying language nor that a quantitative method of any sort can provide 
us with insights about language if we do not have a qualitatively sophisticated 
theory thereof. With these caveats clear in mind, we can however proceed to 
explore if certain aspects of language, like many of the natural world, can become 
an object of inquiry approachable with both tools which characterized the 
scientific revolution of the XVII century: abstraction from everyday opinion, 
idealization, deduction, on one side (the qualitative ‘revolution’), and precise 
measurability of complex entities (so important e.g. in Lavoisier’s establishment 
of modern chemistry (Koyré 1961)), on the other. Our recent comparative method 
(Longobardi & Guardiano 2009) tries to test these tools on, and to contribute to, 
historical investigation of languages and the populations speaking them. Genetics 
is an important model for this enterprise, because over the past 50 years it has 
undergone three developments which all concern us here: 1) it has constantly 
increased the accuracy and abstractness (in the sense of remoteness from everyday 
observation) of its entities, from genetic markers to DNA sequences to whole 
genomes; 2) has used this ever growing theoretical knowledge as a tool for 
historical knowledge, with the development of population genetics and molecular 
anthropology; 3) has endowed itself with elaborate statistical and computational 
tools to represent the history and structure of biological populations. 
In all these senses, we have a lot to learn from genetics and the associated 
mathematics, well beyond the already exciting possible comparison of our 
empirical results in historical linguistics with theirs. 
Syntax, in linguistics, is the domain which has perhaps undergone some of 
the most apparent theoretical change and progress. In fact, in syntax, although 
great advance in the diachronic application of formal linguistic theory has been 
made from Lightfoot’s (1979) seminal work on, few really historical discoveries 
can be pointed out, in the sense of actual growth of our factual knowledge of the 
past. Perhaps it is not accidental that the salient attempt of this kind I have in 
mind, the syntactic dating of Beowulf developing out of Pintzuk and Kroch’s 
(1989) approach, is precisely the product of the most impressive revolution in the 
use of quantitative and computational methods in historical linguistics we have 
recently witnessed, namely corpora syntax. 
In the enterprise you are asking me about, I would like to explore and 
stress the benefit that both qualitatively sophisticated theory and quantitative 
applications of it may reserve for linguistic history and, perhaps, a science of 
human history, more generally. A science of human history is in its infancy, but 
some reflections on the features it should have are not impossible (see e.g. the last 
chapter of Diamond 1998). I think this would be very important: paraphrasing but 
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reversing a famous thinker (Marx 1888), I would like to say that so far 
philosophers and human scientists have hoped or tried to change human history 
(often meeting with disastrous outcomes, from Plato’s misadventures in Syracuse 
on); now for the first time we should seriously begin to understand it. The modern 
cognitive sciences can be a good vantage point for a breakthrough if theoretical 
and historical concerns are conjugated, and qualitative and quantitative 
sophistication is pursued. More than higher renowned thinkers, a pre-scientific 
precursor of this research program, in my personal view, is the pre-Enlightenment 
Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1746), who envisaged an imaginative 
though then unthinkable ‘New Science’ of human intellect and history at the same 
time. 
 
Your LanGeLin project addresses Charles Darwin’s question “whether the 
cultural transmission and differentiation of languages over the period of 
human history matches the biological transmission and differentiation of the 
genetic characters which define the populations of the world”. This goal 
touches on three prima facie independent domains: culture, biology, and 
language. What is the precise position of language in such a ‘triangle’? Is it 
equally determined by culture as it is by biology? Is the relationship 
asymmetric? 
The LanGeLin project plans to use syntax, rather than vocabulary and lexical 
meanings, as a tool to reconstruct linguistic history. It is a plausible guess that as 
syntax should be free from the arbitrariness of lexical meanings, it should also be 
less directly influenced by the variability of culture. Of course, if we find that 
genetic diversity and syntactic diversity are measurably correlated with each other 
in a significant way (Longobardi et al. 2015), without there being direct causation 
between the two variables, then it is possible that differences in other cultural 
features (say, laws, culinary traditions etc.) may also interestingly correlate with 
language diversity. I think this is likely to be the case, but to demonstrate it, it will 
be necessary to reduce some of these domains to measurable entities, exactly as 
we are trying to do with syntax. 
As for the relationship of language with culture and biology, it goes 
without saying that we expect it to be somewhat asymmetric: language variability 
is environmental, the biology of languages appears heavily invariant across the 
species. 
 
Some recent studies argue that it is diversity what truly characterizes human 
language, often implying that the universal nature of language is wrong (or 
that some allegedly specific trait, such as recursion, is not present in all 
languages). Is this scenario a residue of the fact that the I-language / E-
language distinction has not been understood? Is it something else? 
I completely agree that diversity is very characteristic of human language, and 
that is my main motivation for studying it. But I think that a good deal of the 
debate about universals, if it is really a debate, is little more than some folklore 
offered by us linguists to non-linguistic audiences. The question of what is 
universal is a matter of detailed empirical argument and goes much beyond 
recursion/non-recursion, not to speak of oversimplifications like universals vs. no 
universals. For example, I don’t think one can properly claim that there are natural 
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languages which do not have recursion at the abstract level of the general rule 
Merge (a schema which combines two syntactic objects into a third one, which 
can in turn be combined with another one, and so on): more appropriately, the 
question could be if it is universal to have recursion of sentential constituents, 
basically to have subordinate clauses. Other issues, even more interesting, 
perhaps, and sensible, are tied to more fine-grained, though no less general, 
concepts of syntactic theory: e.g. are there languages allowing super-raising, or 
assigning higher scope to wh-phrases already fronted to a peripheral sentence 
position, or allowing reflexives to have ambiguous antecedency outside their 
minimal clause, just to cite some. However, these potential candidates for 
universality are not so popular as targets in the literature trying to state the no-
universals thesis. Is that the consequence of their being really unfalsified as 
potential universals, or just to the fact that the so-called debate lacks in analytical 
depth? Perhaps, it will turn out that they are not universal conditions on language, 
but I still have to see detailed arguments, which would be very interesting for the 
theory of language diversity, against their apparent invariance. This I would be 
ready to call a real scientific debate about universals. 
But there is another point to be stressed, one which is often ignored, in a 
very misleading way for non-linguistic audiences, namely that there is much more 
agreement on the existence of many implicational universals, even among 
linguists who have argued against various absolute universals: therefore, 
implicitly or under different names, a rich form of universal grammar is de facto 
more widely acknowledged. 
 
Within the Generative Enterprise, the research stemming from the Principles 
and Parameters framework has proven very fruitful to study both variation 
and uniformity. However, this trend has been subject to much criticism, on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds. In your opinion, what is the status of 
“Parameter Theory” nowadays? 
The main question here is the setting of language diversity and parameter theory 
(I do not see a more realistic attempt at capturing diversity, with all its open 
issues) within the minimalist program in generative syntax. Apparently, some 
linguists understood the minimalist program mainly as a strive for simplicity and 
axiomatization of the theory of grammar, which it certainly is, as one of its 
ultimate consequences. In this sense, any addition to, and complication of, 
universal grammar (and parameters are one) may appear scarcely minimalist. Of 
course, one should also wonder if non-parametric variation (say, of a more 
arbitrary type) would be more appealing. The real problem here is the very fact of 
grammatical diversity, not any theory of it. But, independently of this point, I 
regard as the central issue of minimalism the question of finding explanations for 
the current state of the language faculty, basically for why it developed the way it 
did (evolutionary adequacy, Longobardi 2003). As such, we are still desperately 
far away from any convincing theory, but one way of proceeding I have started to 
suggest in Longobardi (2005) is the following: let us try to identify similarity of 
format for parameters from various domains and let us classify parameters into 
few recurrent formal schemata (e.g. does feature F overtly or covertly attract 
category X?). This would decompose hundreds of parameters into few schemata 
and a number of primitive features, to which the schemata may apply. One 
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consequence is that the number of entities to be attributed to the initial state of 
mind will decrease immediately and substantially, and then that it will be 
necessary or desirable to find evolutionary explanations for a limited number of 
entities (schemata). Once one instance of a schema was introduced into language, 
it could have been replicated for other instances of F and X. This is a very 
unspecific research program, but a promising one for the future. This way 
parameter theory would become perfectly compatible with minimalism and would 
be a central component of language as, indeed, both a mirror of mind and a mirror 
of history. 
 
What are the challenges that we will have to address in the following decades 
when it comes to study language and its variation? 
The central challenge concerns the right level of analysis between the two 
objectives of achieving wide typological scope (a wide amount of diverse 
languages, such as the hundreds used e.g. in WALS) and satisfactory depth of 
study for each language (ideally, Chomsky’s 1964 classical descriptive adequacy). 
Ultimately, we would wish to achieve both to the highest possible degree: I think 
that this latter point should be uncontroversial, unless one wants, indeed, to 
arbitrarily predefine the empirical domain or the depth of axiomatization that 
linguistic theory should attain. Reality is still very far from this golden standard, 
though. 
So, some intermediate strategy must be envisaged. Not many decades ago, 
one phrase, ‘the third way’ (between Western systems and socialist economies) 
became very popular with some political movements in Southern Europe. The 
attempt to find a third way in that sense ended up as a failure, probably for 
extrinsic historical reasons which went well beyond the strategy and decision 
capacity of those politicians. But what I suspect is that third ways are intrinsically 
hard to achieve in any complex system, because every system including scientific 
research programs are internally interconnected and difficult to mix with other 
systems and strategies. In addition, in our case we have the problem that under a 
realistic philosophical approach to language structures we do not wish to give up 
any serious bit of descriptive adequacy, whenever it looks attainable: i.e. in 
principle we do not want to lose generalizations which we regard as plausibly true 
about the mind of speakers for the sake of adding more unanalyzed evidence from 
other languages.  
Therefore, I am more confident in the research strategy of having 
parametric syntax evolve slowly and progressively toward applicability to a larger 
number of different languages. 
Of course, the enterprise risks to be titanic, something, in theory, like 
writing generative grammars for all attested languages. For this reason, I have 
been proposing and following, for the past 10 years, what I call Modularized 
Global Parametrization (Longobardi 2003), a strategy which consists of pursuing 
the maximum of practically attainable typological exhaustiveness for detailed and 
sometimes deductively intricate parametric hypotheses, at the cost of focusing on 
small compact modules of grammar. This latter cost is what tries to control for the 
enormous work that combining scope and depth would require. I really think that 
this is the only way to go for a theory of linguistic diversity, even for the sake of 
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building learnability models of some plausibility, i.e. for addressing classical 
explanatory adequacy in a realistic fashion. 
Another problem there is the ‘supposed objectivity’ of descriptive structures. I 
had a quick but, as on other occasions, stimulating conversation on this with 
Martin Haspelmath, recently. It may appear that a surface level of analysis (say, in 
terms of Dixon’s 1997 concept of Basic Linguistic Theory) is more 
uncontroversial than complex hypotheses on mental structures generating surface 
strings: but my position is that this is a dubious conclusion, because in a sense we 
must suppose that there is one theory which is the correct one for a language or a 
mind, and the best approximation to it should be the simplest system of axioms 
accounting for the largest amount of data; of course, especially due to the 
conflicting requirements (simplicity and predictive scope), there may be, and 
normally there is, a lot of uncertainty as to the ‘best’ theory. But, is the notion 
surface description more objective? Perhaps quite the opposite, since there is no 
definite criterion to decide what is an observational fact, at what shallow level of 
analysis we should stop looking for further generalizations in order not to risk 
going beyond Basic Linguistic Theory. I am not saying that these problems cannot 
be addressed, but they seem less simple than just pursuing the usual search for the 
best generalization in science, with all its inevitable issues, consequences, but also 
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